Causation, Association, and Confirmation by Wheeler, Gregory & Scheines, Richard
1 
 
Causation, Association and Confirmation 
 
Gregory Wheeler1 & Richard Scheines2 
 
 
Abstract 
Many philosophers of science have argued that a set of evidence that is 
"coherent" confirms a hypothesis which explains such coherence.   In this 
paper, we examine the relationships between probabilistic models of all 
three of these concepts: coherence, confirmation, and explanation.  For 
coherence, we consider Shogenji's measure of association (deviation from 
independence).  For confirmation, we consider several measures in the 
literature, and for explanation, we turn to Causal Bayes Nets and resort to 
causal structure and its constraint on probability.  All else equal, we show 
that focused correlation, which is the ratio of the coherence of evidence 
and the coherence of the evidence conditional on a hypothesis, tracks 
confirmation.  We then show that the causal structure of the evidence and 
hypothesis can put strong constraints on how coherence in the evidence 
does or does not translate into confirmation of the hypothesis.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
It has long been held that “coherent” evidence confirms a hypothesis which explains the 
coherence of such evidence.  For example, if five of your friends come down with a 
stomach ailment on Tuesday after going to the same restaurant on Monday evening 
without even seeing each other, then this powerfully confirms the hypothesis that they got 
food poisoning from that restaurant.  The hypothesis explains the evidence because the 
food served by the restaurant is a common cause of the five separate stomach ailments.  
Alternatively, if we know that the five friends did not eat at the same restaurant on 
Monday, but we do know that all met each other and either shook hands or kissed at one 
time or another during the day, then the co-occurrence of their Tuesday stomach trouble 
is no evidence at all for restaurant induced food poisoning; the explanation is quite 
different: they passed a stomach virus from one to the other.   The difference between the 
cases is not the "coherence" of the evidence, but rather the causal explanation of this 
coherence.  In the first case the association of their stomach ailment is due entirely to the 
influence of a common cause, and in the second case it is due entirely to a causal 
relationship directly between the friends.   
 
In this paper we discuss more systematically and formally the connections between 1) the 
causal relationships between a hypothesis under consideration and evidence relevant to 
the hypothesis, 2) the coherence of this evidence, and 3) the degree to which the evidence 
confirms the hypothesis.   
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Bayesian epistemologists have given us probabilistic models of both coherence and 
confirmation, and philosophers, computer scientists, and statisticians have given us 
probabilistic models of causal systems.3  Our task is to show how these pieces might or 
might not fit together. In this paper, our focus is not on coherence, confirmation, or how 
they are to be modeled, but rather on the relationship between coherence and 
confirmation and how this relationship might be mediated by the causal relationships 
among the hypothesis and the evidence.  In particular, we will consider situations in 
which the pieces of evidence in two sets of evidence are equally relevant to a hypothesis 
individually, the coherence of the sets differ, but the causal structure is identical, as well 
as situations in which the pieces are equally relevant, the sets are equally coherent, but 
the causal structure is different.  These cases will hopefully bring out the role that causal 
structure plays in mediating the relationship between coherence and confirmation.    
 
The organization of the paper is as follows.  In section 2 we review coherentism from the 
perspective of Bayesian epistemology.  In section 3 we introduce the assumptions and 
models we will use to give structure to notions of coherence and confirmation.  In section 
4 we discuss the relationship between coherence and confirmation simpliciter. In section 
5 we introduce the idea of focused correlation (Wheeler 2009) and extend results 
connecting coherence to confirmation through focused correlation.  In section 6 we 
present the case for making causal beliefs explicit, and trace several consequences for the 
relationship between coherence and confirmation that arise solely from the causal 
structure governing the evidence and hypothesis. 
 
2. Coherence as Probabilisitic Association 
 
In 1985, Laurence BonJour4 gave some structure to the coherence theory of justification 
by laying out criteria for a theory of coherence. (He later despaired of meeting those 
demands and quit the theory altogether, but that is another story.5) His postulates for 
coherentism mention a role for probability, and several authors, operating under the 
heading of “Bayesian epistemology”, have explored the prospects of developing a 
probabilistic measure of coherence along his basic outline.6    
 
Much of this work in Bayesian epistemology concerns coherence among a set of 
statements and whether a probabilistic measure of coherence can be adduced which is 
“truth-conducive”, that is, whether in fact higher coherence among a set means more 
reason for belief in that set, ceteris paribus.  Another perspective divides things up into 
hypotheses we care about, either decision theoretically or scientifically, and evidence we 
might collect, possess, or already know about which may be epistemically relevant to 
these hypotheses.  Coherence in this setting is coherence among only the evidence, and 
the question explored is whether evidential coherence makes any epistemic difference to 
the hypotheses upon which that evidence might bear, ceteris paribus.  It is this 
perspective that we explore here.   
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Perhaps the most obvious and most common account of epistemic coherence is to portray 
coherence as probabilistic association, that is, the degree to which evidential propositions 
co-occur relative to how much they might or might not.  We take binary evidential 
variables as representing propositions.  For example, suppose that E1 is a binary evidence 
variable representing a witness report, where E1=true codes for "the witness reported fact 
1 is the case," written E1 for short, and E1=false codes for "the witness reports that fact 1 
is not the case," written ¬E1 for short. Then perhaps the most straightforward account of 
evidential coherence in this tradition7 is the association (i.e., deviation from 
independence) measure advanced by Tomoji Shogenji (1999), which is presented here in 
standard and conditional form:8 
 
    . 
 
Here binary evidence variables E1 and E2 are positively associated (associated conditional 
on a hypothesis, H) if S is greater than 1, independent (conditionally independent on H) if 
S is 1, and negatively associated (negatively associated conditional on H) if S is less than 
1.  
 
Shogenji interprets S (in unconditional form) as a measure of “pairwise coherence”, 
which evaluates “the degree by which the two beliefs [E1=true and E2=true] are more 
likely true together than they would be if they were [probabilistically independent]” 
(Shogenji 1999, 339). Even though Shogenji interprets this measure to apply to cases in 
which the evidence variables are assigned “true”, and thus to concern the coherence of a 
pair of propositions, the notion of coherence here is probabilistic association among 
evidence variables rather than concurrent agreement of an information set.  After all, the 
measure has no meaning without a joint probability distribution over all the possible 
states for the variables. 
 
Association fails to capture many aspects of evidential coherence, and some might argue 
that it fails to capture any of them.   Our interest is not in entering that debate, however, it 
is rather in considering the relationship between coherence and confirmation, and how 
causation helps mediate this relationship.  So, without prejudicing the debate or claiming 
it is adequate, we will use Shogenji's measure of coherence in what follows.   
 
3. Confirmation 
 
The debate about how to characterize the idea (or mirage) of confirmation, and whether 
the probability calculus is the right tool for the job, is similarly contentious and far from 
settled.  We have no desire to enter this fray either – only to examine how popular 
probabilistic conceptions of confirmation relate to popular probabilistic notions of 
coherence.  
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Several measures of confirmation have been offered.  A few of the more popular ones use 
probability to express how much confirmation an evidence set E provides to a hypothesis 
H (Elles and Fitelson 2002):  
 
• 
€ 
r(H,E) =df log
P(H |E)
P(H)  
 
• 
€ 
l(H ,E) =df log
P(E | H)
P(E |¬H)  
 
• 
€ 
ko(H,E) =df
P(E | H) − P(E |¬H)
P(E | H) + P(E |¬H) . 
 
Cohen (1977) and  Earman (1992) define the incremental confirmation of E2 on H after 
we already know E1: 
 
€ 
inc1(H,E1,E2) =df P(H | E1∩E2) − P(H | E1)  
 
An extension of incremental confirmation that normalizes for how much room above 
P(H|E1) there is for E2 to “boost” the posterior of H is: 
 
€ 
inc2 (H,E1,E2) =df
P(H | E1∩E2) − P(H | E1)
1− P(H | E1)  
 
Confirmation and Coherence 
 
Using Shogenji's measure of association as a measure of evidential coherence, and any of 
the measures of confirmation given above, we can ask whether there is a relationship 
between the coherence of an evidence set and the confirmation it provides to a 
hypothesis.  More formally, is it the case, or, under what conditions is it the case, that for 
two evidence sets E and E’, and one of the measures of confirmation above, confi, 
 
S(E) > S(E’)  ⇒  conf i(H,E) > conf i(H,E’)? 
 
As many authors have noted, the answer is clearly no. It is not the coherence of the 
evidence, but its relation to H and the reason for the coherence that makes the difference.  
For example, consider again the food poisoning vs. communicable virus hypotheses and 
the evidence that five of your friends are stricken with stomach problems on Tuesday.   
Whatever the coherence of this evidence in Shogenji's sense, it provides quite different 
confirmation to each hypothesis.  The problem is that it is not the coherence or lack of 
such between the health of our five friends, but the reason for the coherence that is 
telling.   
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Probabilistic attempts to secure a connection between coherence and confirmation either 
smuggle in a reason for the coherence (e.g., the partially reliable witness model of 
Hartmann and Bovens, 2003a,b), or rely upon a definition of coherence that is partially 
built from the confirmation relation (e.g., Bovens and Hartmann, 2003b).   
 
4. Ceterus Paribus 
 
What we now want to explore is whether, all else equal, evidence sets that are 
differentially coherent provide differential confirmation to a hypothesis H.  In this section 
we attempt to formalize and clarify "all else equal." 
 
In what follows, we will assume that the domain D = <H,E> is a hypothesis H=true and 
an evidence set E = {E1=true,..,En=true), where H and E1,..,En are propositional (binary) 
variables, none of which are logically related.  A proposition conveniently expresses 
either the content of a proposition, or a witness report of a proposition.  Extending what 
follows to real-valued variables is certainly possible. 
 
By insisting that no logical relations obtain, which we do for two reasons, we mean that 
there are positive probability distributions over D in which every pair of variables X and 
Y are probabilistically independent.  This is not possible, for example, in a setting in 
which E1 = The Butler did it, and E2 = The Butler did it or The Cook did it, for in no 
positive distribution is E1 independent of E2.  We assume this in order to activate the 
theory of causal Bayes nets, which require variables that are unrelated logically, and also 
to avoid what we take to be distracting puzzles that trade on logical relations between 
variables.9   
 
We assume that P(D), a probability distribution over a domain of propositions D = 
<H,E>10 is positive.   
 
We say that two distinct pieces of evidence Ei and Ej are equally confirmatory for a 
hypothesis H iff  
• P(H | Ei) = P(H | Ej), and 
• P(H | ¬Ei) = P(H | ¬Ej) 
 
We consider two assumptions 
 
(A1) Positive Relevance: all propositions in a set of evidence E are positively 
relevant to H, i.e.,  ∀Ei ∈ E, P(H | Ei)  >  P(H) > P(H | ¬Ei) 
 
(A2) Equal Relevance: all propositions in a set of evidence E are equally 
confirmatory, i.e., ∀Ei Ej ∈ E, P(H | Ei)  =  P(H | Ej), P(H | ¬Ei)  =  P(H | ¬Ej). 
  
Call an evidence set whose elements satisfy (A1) with respect to H a positive  
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evidence set for H, and call an evidence set whose elements satisfy (A1) and (A2) for H 
an equally positive evidence set (epe) for H.  
 
These assumptions probabilistically encode what we take “ceteris paribus” to mean in an 
investigation on the relation between probabilistic notions of coherence and confirmation. 
We want to compare the confirmatory power for H of two sets of evidence E and E’, 
where E and E’ are identical in all respects except for their coherence.  That is, we want 
to consider sets E and E’ which are comparable in terms of how confirmatory each 
individual piece of evidence is to H, but that differ in terms of their overall coherence, 
and ask which set does more to confirm H.  This is how we interpret the question: Does 
more coherent evidence do more to confirm H, ceteris paribus.   
 
5.  Focused Correlation 
 
Wheeler (2009) attempted to address the apparent disconnect between coherence and 
confirmation by using a relation between coherence and conditional coherence on a 
hypothesis first introduced by Myrvold (1996).  Wheeler examined how different degrees 
of  "focused correlation" track different degrees of confirmation.   
 
The focused correlation of a set of evidence E = {E1,..,En) with respect to a hypothesis H 
is the ratio of the coherence/association of the evidence conditional on H to the 
coherence/association of the evidence simpliciter, which can be expressed generally as: 
 
ForH(E1,..,En) := =  =  
 
Wheeler (2009) drew several connections between focused correlation and confirmation.  
Before examining the role of causal structure, we strengthen these connections for the 
case of evidence sets with two variables.     
 
Consider Hypothesis H and evidence sets E = {E1, E2} and E’ = {E1, E3} satisfying 
assumption (A1) above.  For each of the confirmation measures above, the confirmation 
of H on an evidence set E is positive (greater than 0) if ForH(E) is positive (greater than 
1).  
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Proposition 1:  If E is a positive evidence set for H, and ForH(E) > 1, then all of 
the following hold: 
• r(H,E) > 0 
• l(H,E) > 0 
• ko(H,E) > 0 
• inc1(H,E) > 0 
• inc2(H,E) > 0 
 
Proposition 1 says that for any evidence set E that satisfies (A1), if E has a focused 
correlation for H above 1, then E provides positive confirmation of H by any of the  
above confirmation measures.   If a set of evidence has more Shogenji coherence 
conditional on H that it does unconditionally, then the evidence provides positive 
confirmation to H.  This is good progress, but because the condition is not necessary, it 
still leaves open the situations in which ForH(E) < 1.  
 
When we strengthen the assumptions regarding the uniformity of the evidence, focused 
correlation tracks confirmation:   
 
Proposition 2:  If E={E1, E2} and E’= {E1, E3}, and E ∪ E’ is an equally 
positive evidence set for H, then all of the following inequalities are 
equivalent: 
• ForH(E) >  ForH(E’)  
• r(H, E) > r(H, E’) 
• l(H, E) > l(H, E’) 
• ko(H,E) > ko(H, E’) 
• inc1(H, E) > inc1(H, E’) 
• inc2(H, E)> inc2(H, E’) 
 
So in several senses, focused correlation tracks confirmation and incremental 
confirmation, whereas simple coherence (association) does not.  Looking at the formula 
for focused correlation, it is immediate that two equally positive evidence (epe) sets can 
have equal association while having unequal focused correlation, and thus confirmation.   
 
Why does the focused correlation capture something about the relationship between 
coherence and confirmation? Part of the answer, we believe, is the causal structure 
governing the system.   
 
6. Causal Structure 
 
Generally, Causal Bayes Nets  (CBNs) provide all the apparatus needed to represent 
causal structure,11 and to characterize the constraints such structures impose on the 
probability distributions they might represent.  Let a causal graph G = {V,E} be a set of 
random variables V and a set of directed edges E such that Ei  Ej ∈ E if and only if Ei 
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is a direct cause of Ej relative to V.  The set of direct causes of a variable are its parents.  
A set of variables V is causally sufficient just in case for every pair of variables Vi ,Vj ∈ 
V, the common causes of Vi ,Vj  are also in V.   
 
An acyclic causal graph G and a probability distribution P(V) over the variables12 in G 
satisfy the Causal Markov Axiom (Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 2000) just in case 
P(V) factors according to the causal graph: 
 
 
 
This factorization13 imposes independence constraints on the distributions P(V) which 
can be generated by a given causal graph.  These constraints are characterized by the 
graph-theoretic relation of d-separation, (Pearl, 1988).  One can view the independence 
constraints imposed by this factorization as the non-parametric consequences of 
qualitative causal structure.   
 
An additional axiom typically applied to CBNs is the Faithfulness assumption (Spirtes, et 
al., 2000).  A graph G and a probability distribution P(V) over the variables14 in G satisfy 
the Faithfulness Axiom just in case the only independence relations in P(V) are those 
entailed by the Causal Markov axiom (d-separation). 
 
If causal structure alone plays a mediating role between coherence and confirmation, then 
it should be through the independence constraints in distributions that are Markov and 
Faithful to the causal graphs that govern the relationship between evidence and 
hypothesis.   
 
One obvious interpretation of the Bovens and Hartmann 2003 model of partially reliable, 
independent witness reports is Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Common Cause Model for Bovens and Hartmann  
 
A simplification of the Bovens-Hartmann model is the single-factor common cause 
model (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Single-Factor Common Cause Model 
 
 
Interpreted as a CBN this model entails the evidence is independent conditional on H, 
that is, any coherence among the evidence is due to H: 
 
∀i,j,  Ei _||_ Ej | H.15 
 
How does the causal structure in the single-factor common cause model mediate the 
relationship between coherence and confirmation?  The answer is that, in this model, the 
coherence of the evidence is strictly a function of the degree to which the evidence is 
individually associated with the hypothesis, so there is no way to separate coherence and 
confirmation – they are perfectly intertwined.16 
 
How does causal structure more generally constrain or mediate the relationship between 
coherence and confirmation? Consider a causal model (Figure 3) that simultaneously 
represents three important extremal cases: 
 
….. 
H 
….. R1 
Rep1 
R2 
Rep2 
Rn 
Repn 
a c 
b 
H 
E1 E2 ….. En 
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1. All the coherence among the evidence is because of the hypothesis  
(E = {E1,E2}) 
2. None of the coherence among the evidence is because of the hypothesis  
(E’ = {E1,E3}) 
3. The evidence has no coherence, but is individually related to the hypothesis (E’’ 
= {E1,E4}) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Causal Model of Home Team Wins 
 
 
The hypothesis H of interest is whether one’s home sporting team wins in some big game 
that you cannot directly witness.  Consider several pieces of evidence relevant to this 
hypothesis.   
 
E1 is whether or not the home team’s star player is injured going into the game, and 
similarly for E4 and the visiting team’s star player. We “code” E1 as health and E4 as 
“injury” so that both are positively relevant to H.  Both of these facts are evidence of, but 
also causes of, the hypothesis of interest.  As the star players for the two teams have no 
causal connection relating to injury, we assume that E1 and E4 are causally and 
probabilistically independent.  E3 is the published injury report about the home team’s 
star player prior to the game.  As any sports fan knows, such reports are only partially 
reliable.17  Still, we assume that such a report is an effect of whether or not the home 
team’s star player is in fact healthy, and probabilistically independent of everything else 
given the state of the star player’s health.   Finally, we have the testimony of a partially 
reliable witness E2 on the outcome of the game.  
 
First, consider the two sets of evidence E = {E1, E2} and E’ = {E1, E3}.  The coherence in 
E is for the same reason that different effects of a common cause are coherent: any 
coherence between E1 and E2 is the result of the correlation between E1 and H and 
between H and E2.  E’ is the other extreme – none of the coherence between E1 and E3 is 
the result of the correlation between E1 and H and between H and E3.   If E and E’ have 
Home Team Wins 
H 
Visiting Team’s 
Star Player Injured 
E4 
Home Team’s  
Star Player Healthy 
E1 
Home Team’s 
Published Injury Report 
E3 
Witness Report 
E2 
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identical coherence, do they afford different degrees of confirmation to H?  Since both 
sets share E1, this reduces to the question of whether the incremental confirmation 
afforded by E2 always exceeds that of E3, or vice versa, or neither one.  
 
By the causal structure of this model, H and E3 are independent conditional on E1, P(H | 
E1) = P(H | E1, E3), thus E3 provides zero incremental confirmation after E1.  Thus the 
question of whether E and E’ afford different degrees of confirmation to H reduces to 
whether E2 provides positive incremental confirmation to H conditional on E1, i.e., P(H | 
E1, E2) > P(H | E1).  The answer is yes, and it makes no difference how strong the 
relationship between H and E2 is.  
 
Proposition 3:  If E = {E1, E2} and E’ = {E1, E3} are positive evidence sets 
for H, then in any probability distribution P(H, E1, E2, E3} that is Markov and 
Faithful to the causal graph in Figure 3, inc1(H,E1,E2) > inc1(H,E1,E3).18 
 
So coherence plays no role whatsoever in this case, except through the “side door.”  The 
coherence between E1 and E3 is entirely the result of the direct causal influence of E1 on 
E3.  In the case of E1 and E2, however, positive coherence between E1 and E2 must arise 
through the path that goes through H.  
 
So in the case of E = {E1,E2} and E’ = {E1,E3}, by the causal arrangements shown in 
Figure 3, and by the assumption that all evidence is individually positively relevant to H, 
E will provide more confirmation than E’ to H, regardless of the coherence of either 
set.19  It is the causal structure of the situation which drives things.  
 
Zero Coherence 
 
Now consider evidence sets E = {E1,E2} and E’’ = {E1,E4}.  From the causal graph in 
Figure 3, we know that E1 and E4 are probabilistically independent, so E’’ has zero 
association and a Shogenji coherence equal to 1.  Is it nevertheless possible for E’’ to 
provide more confirmation to H than E, which has positive coherence?   The answer, 
surprisingly, is yes.   
 
Proposition 4:20 In cases for which E and E’’ are equally positive evidence (epe) 
sets for H, then inc1(H,E1,E4) > inc1(H,E1,E2)  if and only if 
€ 
S(E1,E2) >
α
β
  
where 
€ 
α =
P(H | E i)
P(H)  and  
€ 
β =
P(H | E1,E4 )
P(H | E1)
. 
 
The incremental confirmation from an evidence set with zero coherence (E’’) exceeds the 
confirmation from an evidence set with positive coherence (E) just in case the coherence 
of E is greater than the ratio of the incremental confirmation provided by E1 to the 
incremental confirmation provided by E4 after knowing E1.  
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7.  Conclusion 
 
Explicating notions of coherence and confirmation have occupied philosophers of science 
for hundreds of years.  Further, most every philosopher since William Whewell who has 
discussed both notions has connected them.  Recently, many have tried to model these 
ideas and the connection between them using just the probability calculus.  Attempts to 
connect coherence simpliciter to confirmation are bound to fail, as probabilistic models 
of coherence make no reference to either the reason for coherence or the reason any piece 
of evidence in a set of evidence should relate to H.  In our view, any such effort ought to 
include, explicitly in the formalism, both the reason the evidence is coherent and how the 
evidence is connected to H.  We have tried to argue that focused correlation and causal 
structure move in this direction. 
 
Focused correlation, a fully probabilistic measure which compares the coherence of an 
evidence set conditional on the hypothesis it might or might not confirm to the 
unconditional coherence of the set turns out to be a powerful indicator of when coherence 
helps confirmation as well as a powerful indicator of which evidence sets are more 
helpful than others.  It is not the complete story, either, however, as in some cases 
comparing the focused correlation of two evidence sets underdetermines the confirmation 
relation.   
 
Since evidence can be causally connected to other evidence and to the hypothesis in 
virtually any way possible, it turns out to be very useful to explicitly and formally model 
the causal structure governing the evidence and the hypothesis.  Even when one connects 
causal structure to probability only qualitatively through independence and conditional 
independence, quite a lot about the relationship between coherence and confirmation can 
be adduced.  In cases in which all the evidence are effects of the hypothesis and 
otherwise causally independent, coherence and confirmation are tightly connected.21  In 
cases in which the coherence between the evidence has nothing causally to do with the 
hypothesis, coherence and confirmation are utterly disconnected.  In cases in which 
pieces of evidence are not caused by the hypothesis nor cause each other, the story is 
more complicated, but extremely rich nonetheless.   
 
We have not offered a proof that focused correlation and/or causal structure are the only 
keys to the castle, nor do we think one is forthcoming.  Nor have we offered anything 
approaching a complete theory of coherence and confirmation through focused 
correlation and causal structure.  We hope, however, that we have shown that these tools 
can take us much farther than probabilistic models of coherence and confirmation alone.  
13 
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